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In the United States, there are multiple models of poli-
cy-making, some more well-known than others (Lasswell, 
1951; Peterson, 1991). In general, these models have a nor-
mative basis that equates pluralist systems of democratic 
governance with economic free market systems. Thus cer-
tain political configurations, such as decentralized govern-
ment structures, are assumed to have economic benefits. 
Such assumptions do not necessarily appear in European 
models of decentralization. This paper lays out the U.S. 
intergovernmental models, and then examines some of the 
key assumptions of such models. It is then examined how 
such models fare in the local policy-making environments 
of Japan and Korea under the decentralization programs of 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. This examination highlights 
a marked difference in the understanding (and enactment) 
of the decentralization of policy-making between the U.S. 
* Jill L. Tao, Associate Professor, University of Incheon, South Korea (izvanredna 
profesorica Sveu!ili"ta Incheon, Ju#na Koreja, e-mail: j.tao.808@gmail.com)
340
Jill L. Tao: Textbook vs. Praxis: Comparative Lessons in Policy-Making ...







and East Asia. Finally, some of the decentralization efforts 
in Europe are compared with both U.S. and East Asian 
approaches, and still unique conditions are found in East 
Asia that demonstrate growing rifts between the centre 
and the peripheries.
Key words: policy-making, intergovernmental models, de-
centralization, local government, United States of America , 
Japan, Korea, East Asia
Public policy is what governments choose to do and what 
governments choose not to do. 
(Dye, 2001: 2)
1. Introduction
In the United States, federalism and intergovernmental relations have 
been the two research areas that attempt to bridge the divides between 
more singular models of governing at local and national levels.1 For schol-
ars in East Asia, such models (Peterson, 1995) can often prove frustrating, 
since they assume basic power arrangements between a central govern-
ment, local governments, and general society that do not exist in the same 
fashion elsewhere (Kingdon, 1998). However, such models have often 
been referenced despite their lack of fit because of two factors: first, the 
structure of intergovernmental relations in the U.S. allows for both cen-
tralized and decentralized modes of governance; and second, perceived 
economic benefits that can be derived from a more competitive model of 
local government (Peterson, 1995; Brace, 1993; Rozman, 2002). Part of 
the difficulty in translating such models lies in the lack of discussion of 
these underlying assumptions on which U.S. models are based. As such, 
many attempts have been made in other nations to duplicate the decen-
tralization characteristics of U.S. federalism, expecting political and eco-
nomic results that never materialize.  
1  An initial version of this paper was presented at the meeting of Research Com-
mittee 32, International Political Science Association, June 10–12th, 2011, in Dubrovnik, 
Croatia. The author thanks the anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments that have 
surely improved the quality of the manuscript. All remaining errors or omissions are the 
responsibility of the author alone.
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This has been particularly salient in East Asian countries that have under-
gone attempts to decentralize policy-making in an effort to capitalize on 
anticipated gains in efficiency and effectiveness. Given these differences, 
one might reasonably ask why U.S. models of decentralized policy-mak-
ing are often cited in Korea and Japan, rather than other models that may 
share more characteristics, such as those tried in Europe (Vries, 2000).
What are the expectations one might have for decentralization initiatives 
that are premised on a U.S.-based political economy model in places 
where some of the basic underlying assumptions exist in weak form, if at 
all? What role does the quality of information available to local policymak-
ers play in the kinds of decisions they make? What do assumptions about 
shared values over different levels of government do to the expectations 
that both central and local actors have for decentralization efforts?
This paper will attempt to address these questions by examining two dif-
ferent attempts at decentralizing policy-making decisions to the local level 
of government. Using information from interviews with local government 
officials in Japan and Korea from 2006 to 2007, questions about the na-
ture of both expectations from the national level and local levels of gov-
ernment will be compared with the experiences of local level officials. 
This information highlights key differences between expectations driven 
largely by U.S. models and the realities of power-sharing at the local level 
in East Asia. 
Additionally, the comparison between the anticipated economic benefits 
and the realities of governance demonstrates the unusual relationship bet-
ween the U.S. market system and local politics and assumptions about 
behavioural responses to policy-making. It also demonstrates the lack of 
such assumptions in Korean and Japanese policy-making models, and a 
much greater emphasis on symbolic and party actions than is the norm in 
the American local government system.  
There are also key differences between the Japanese and Korean ap-
proaches to local policy-making that are evident in their expectations of 
the decentralization efforts, especially with respect to the sources of infor-
mation for making key policy decisions. In many ways, this would seem to 
make the Korean and Japanese experiences much more akin to European 
examples from the latter part of the 20th century. However, there are key 
distinctions with respect to country norms and some of the sentiments of 
local government officials that make unexpected pieces of the U.S. policy-
making models more attractive. The possible reasons as to why U.S. mod-
els are cited as more influential are then addressed.
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2.  U.S. Intergovernmental Policy-Making:  
Models and Assumptions
According to Peterson (1995), the U.S. federalist system is stratified in 
ways that divide policy-making powers into levels that match the capaci-
ties and occasionally the needs of different publics. For example, the resi-
dent of City A is simultaneously the resident of a state and a nation. These 
are formal distinctions that structure voting rights and access to particular 
services provided by different levels of government. The crux of Peter-
son’s argument, however, is that the nature of policy-making is different 
at each level because of the unique relationship between the power of 
economic mobility and the power of political jurisdictions. As the size of 
a political jurisdiction increases, so therefore, does the ability of political 
power to influence economic power. Therefore, Peterson concludes that 
certain levels of government are appropriate for particular kinds of policy: 
states and national governments are the only levels capable of engaging in 
the redistribution of resources. Anything below that level lacks sufficient 
power to compete with the influence of market actors, especially those 
that can provide economies of scale. 
This competitive model of markets and governments is distinct from the 
more corporatist models in East Asia. Both Japan and Korea have long 
histories of strong ties between economic and political power at the na-
tional level, where coalitions are forged between private sector compa-
nies, the flow of capital through banks, and the political elite. In fact, it is 
often difficult for businesses in East Asia to understand the independent 
nature of most American business when it comes to national political ties. 
It also means that the role and powers of local governments in the U.S. 
may be viewed through a somewhat distinctive lens.  
Local governments are largely left to their own devices in the U.S. Peter-
son (1981) has pointed out that successful cities are often defined as such 
in economic terms – and in keeping with the Tiebout (1951) argument, 
they compete with each other for two things: median taxpayers and those 
things that will attract median taxpayers. The latter category provides the 
most fodder for discussion since there is still a great deal of disagreement 
as to what attracts the median taxpayer, or even what is defined as the 
median taxpayer. In general, however, there is agreement that median 
taxpayers are property owners who will pay the predominant form of local 
tax: property tax. Property taxes are generally collected and distributed 
at the county level of government, with minimal oversight or interference 
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from the state. The major contenders for property tax tend to be cities 
and the county (or counties) in which they reside. In this sense, the U.S. 
model is similar to some European models of local fiscal autonomy (Vries, 
2000). This is also something that therefore distinguishes local policy-
making in the U.S. and Europe from its East Asian equivalents.  
Local governments have their own revenue stream, and can structure local 
policies to maximize it (Zimmerman, 1992) within their jurisdictions. This 
kind of fiscal autonomy is not formally present in either Japan or South 
Korea. Despite the political reforms of the late 1990s and early 2000s in 
both countries, local governments at the city and prefecture levels have 
limited control over their own revenue streams. Most revenue collected 
at the local level is insufficient to cover basic service provision, so most is 
rendered to the national government, which then redistributes the funds 
according to national policy and local need within those policy priorities 
(Korea 2, 2010; Japan 2, 2007). This means that local officials can exer-
cise limited discretion in following national policies, since without the 
revenue stream from the national government, what they can accomplish 
on their own is limited.
2.1.  Recent Local Government History and »Devolution«
There is another important distinction, which is perhaps the most relevant 
to the comparison that follows. During the »devolution« phase of national 
politics during the mid 1990s in the U.S., the federal government pushed 
many types of policy-making to the state and local levels. The reasons for 
this were both fiscal and ideological. The federal deficit had ballooned 
under the higher interest rates and spending levels for defence during the 
1980s, so the debt had become a political issue at the national level. Fiscal 
conservatives in Congress allied with ideological conservatives who called 
for more decision-making »at levels closer to the people affected by those 
decisions« and reduced federal spending on decisions that were made 
at state and local levels. In 1995, Congress passed the Unfunded Man-
dates Act, which stated that if the federal government issued a mandate 
to states and localities without requisite funding, the states and localities 
need not comply.  
In reality, this was already a common practice, in keeping with requests 
from governors asking for more autonomy (Kincaid, 1998) and Supreme 
Court decisions outlining state responsibilities when accepting federal 
monies (Walker, 1981: 135–191). The legislation was largely symbolic, 
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but met mixed reviews at the state level. In order to make up their losses 
from reduced intergovernmental revenues under the tax cuts and the tax 
caps on property revenue of the 1980s, many states raised taxes on in-
come or imposed fees for services. Thus citizens in high service states, 
such as California, Washington, and New York, often saw little reduction 
in their overall tax burden. As long as inflation was low, however, and the 
ability to borrow or obtain credit was easy, most citizens did not seem to 
mind.
This devolution of authority had a divisive effect on state governments. 
For those who had provided high levels of service, usually in states with 
large urban populations, the government faced a citizenry accustomed to 
that service level and unlikely to accept reductions well. Thus, the need to 
continue taxing and providing services was fuelled by high-level demand 
at the local level. However, for states that had only begrudgingly provided 
services mandated through the provision of federal funds, a reduction in 
mandates meant more local money could be freed up for other purposes. 
Thus, the divide in service provision between traditional urban areas and 
new urban areas, especially in the South and Southwest, became increas-
ingly wider over the decade of the 1990s and into the new millennium.  
This divide meant that state governments had very different experiences, 
depending on their traditional service delivery levels (Brace, 1993). Those 
at the top were now constrained from pursuing new revenue sources, since 
any increase in the cost of living would push people into lower cost areas, 
only exacerbating the revenue stream problem. In some parts of the coun-
try, local governments were capitalizing on the transition of small farms 
into corporate farming, and rezoning agricultural land for residential pur-
poses. Migrations from high land cost areas, such as coastal California, to 
low cost regions, like Texas and Oklahoma, were in full sway. John Husing 
posited that this cost reduction, which he called »dirt theory«, fuelled mi-
grations similar to those of the 1930s, except in reverse (Husing, 2005).
Local governments were often caught in the middle. For those at the very 
top, such as New York or San Francisco, the mix of services and taxation 
attracted enough residents who were comfortable with both to maintain 
city services at high levels. Nevertheless, the key question was local gov-
ernments’ capacity. Local governments without previous experience in ei-
ther trimming service provision or in pursuing alternative revenue streams 
often found themselves behind the curve. In this respect, growing cities 
that were attracting new residents through lower land prices and service 
jobs did not use their new sources of revenue to broaden service provision. 
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Generally, increases in revenues were spent on business attraction: tax 
abatements, redevelopment of downtown areas, or capital projects, which 
still required the acquisition of debt, despite somewhat elevated revenue 
levels. Thus, the policies made at the local level did redistribute resources, 
but the resources went from the population at large to business interests 
(Kotkin and Frey, 2007).  
Politically, the devolution had mixed results. Some urban areas did well, 
especially those with a well-established economic base or an economy of 
scale, like Chicago and New York. Other urban areas with large poor or 
aging populations, however, did not fare so well.  Such populations find 
migrating to take advantage of lower costs of living difficult, so cities with 
a decline in industry (e.g. Detroit) or with large immobile poor popula-
tions (e.g. New Orleans, even pre-Katrina) were especially hard hit. There 
were some gains in efficiency – in general, those who could migrate to a 
place where they were satisfied with the mix of services and taxation. Nev-
ertheless, local governments did not necessarily gain ground in improved 
cost effectiveness. The debt that saddles many local governments across 
the country today is easy to see in capital projects that have not realized 
their projected revenue generation or had the kind of spread effects that 
local governments anticipated (Baade, 1996).
2.2. The Role of Intergovernmental Relations
The rationale for doing so was very different from similar calls during the 
1980s in the U.S. The push for local level decision-making in the U.S. 
came on the heels of decades of attempts by the federal government to 
bypass states and directly influence policies at the local level through 
funding. During the 1970s, many state capitals were backwaters of le-
gislative decision-making, with legislatures that met once every two years 
and deliberated policy matters of limited consequence. Some, especially 
in the southern U.S., were openly hostile to federal policies, and provided 
limited help in implementing policy. Thus, the federal government sought 
to bypass state governments entirely, giving aid directly to cities in an 
attempt to get policies that would represent national priorities put into 
place, especially in health and welfare (Zimmerman, 2009; Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1984).
By the end of the decade, stagflation had overwhelmed the U.S. political 
institutions at all levels of government, and the recession of the early 1980s 
highlighted a need for fiscal austerity and efficiency. However, there was 
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also a sense, especially in state capitals, that the federal government was 
overstepping its bounds, and by the end of the 1980s, funding to local 
governments had dried up while mandates for public policy execution had 
remained intact. Local governments began asking for more flexibility in 
making decisions, since what was good for Detroit, Michigan did not ne-
cessarily make sense for San Antonio, Texas. The argument for devolution 
of authority was pushed by state officials, who were finding like-minded 
officials at the national level. The mantra »the government who governs 
least governs best« became a constant theme, so by the 1990s, when eco-
nomic recovery began in earnest, the idea of economic growth was firmly 
linked with decentralized decision-making.
3. Translating Models 
Some of the key assumptions in the U.S. model of federalism as put for-
ward by Peterson (1995) are related to mobility: the ability of people to 
move from one place to another and for business and capital to relocate 
should conditions elsewhere prove more profitable. Thus, state and lo-
cal governments have an incentive to vary their policies to attract certain 
kinds of residents or business. However, problems arise when states with 
lower knowledge or professional capacities find themselves competing 
with high capacity states for residents or businesses with similar prefer-
ences (Brace, 1993). This is a political economy model that does not fit 
into the norms for political economy in East Asia.
In East Asia, political economy is strongly associated with Marxism, which 
makes discussion about decentralization and centralization interesting. In 
South Korea, for example, if one is studying political economy, one is es-
sentially studying the works of Marx and Engels. In the U.S., Marx and 
Engels appear in courses on political theory or philosophy, and occasion-
ally, in economics. The field of political economy in the U.S. leans much 
more towards economics and the »interference« of politics into market 
functions (Burnham, 1979; Stigler, 1971). Thus, the focus on the move-
ment of labour and capital is assumed to be due to variations in market 
delivery preferences, where local governments serve as policy supermar-
kets, and citizens become shoppers for public goods and services. This is 
far more »economics« and less »politics« than a class-driven model would 
allow. It also presumes that the primary motivation for human behaviour 
is economic, not political. 
347
Jill L. Tao: Textbook vs. Praxis: Comparative Lessons in Policy-Making ...


























Another key characteristic of the U.S. system that should be mentioned 
is the lack of a cohesive party platform at the local level of government. 
The vast majority of local elections in the U.S. are non-partisan: several 
states prohibit candidates from affiliating themselves with a party dur-
ing campaigns. The reasons for such prohibitions are largely due to the 
widespread use of a »reform« model of government, the council-manager 
system, where professionalism is meant to be apolitical. Thus, the lack of 
influence of politics over economics at the local level is to be expected to 
some extent, given the neutered version of politics that is practiced. This 
is a distinction that is notable for its lack of similarity with the East Asian 
systems. Party platforms often drive local elections and policy discussions, 
which brings us to the key questions this paper seeks to address.
4.  Comparative Frameworks: Matching Likes  
and Unlikes
In order to determine in a more systematic fashion how these different 
approaches to local authority and decision-making might be compared 
and conclusions drawn, it helps to have a framework for analysis (Ragin, 
1987). As Ostrom has argued:
»Frameworks organize diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry. They provide 
the most general list of variables that should be used to analyze all types 
of [policy] arrangements. Frameworks provide a metatheoretic language 
that can be used to compare theories. They attempt to identify the uni-
versal elements that any theory relevant to the same kind of phenomena 
would need to include ... Thus, the elements contained in a framework 
help the analyst generate the questions that need to be addressed when 
first conducting an analysis« (Ostrom, 1997: 6).
One of the difficulties in using U.S.-based theories of political federal-
ism is that they are often cobbled together from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives, borrowed from political science: pluralism (Dahl, 1961); 
class distinctions (Polsby, 1968); coalition of elites (Stone, 1989); urban 
and regional planning (Savitch and Vogel, 2009); and economics (Tie-
bout, 1957; Nelson, 1985). Even within a single discipline like political 
science, each distinct theory generates separate and sometimes contra-
dictory expectations for the relationships between structure and power. 
Thus, a framework that incorporates components from multiple theories 
must keep in mind the underlying assumptions for each set of constructs, 
348
Jill L. Tao: Textbook vs. Praxis: Comparative Lessons in Policy-Making ...







variables and measures that have been used to generate hypotheses and 
test the viability of a variety of models. Although I have focused thus far 
on an economically driven model (since within the U.S. this has arguably 
been the most influential in the decentralization discussion), this variety 
needs to be recognized.
This does not mean that a framework for approaching a comparative ana-
lysis of local decision-making need be obtuse or inaccessible. By focusing 
on what Ragin (1987) defines as John Stuart Mill’s »similars and dissimi-
lars«, even complex, highly qualitative information can be compared in a 
systematic way. The real challenge lies in deciding which constructs need 
to be included in such a framework so that a credible analysis can be con-
ducted. Thus, developing a framework for local policy-making in multiple 
country contexts provides an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the 
strengths of such an approach and some of the inherent caveats.
5. Bases for Comparison: Similarities
According to Ragin, establishing similarities and differences across cases 
should be done as simply as possible: with whether or not a condition ex-
ists in each case. This creates a systematic basis for comparison with mul-
tiple variables across cases. It also allows for comparison with variables 
that are not necessarily quantitative or difficult to measure in accurate 
ways.  
Ragin’s methodology is meant to be used for macrosocial variables and 
across multiple cases, where there may not be sufficient data to delve 
into variables in detail. Although the variables in this example are not 
macrosocial, the process of identifying similarities and differences across 
cases can be adjusted to provide a comparative framework for other cases 
that meet a sufficiency criterion.   
The three questions being addressed here deal with decentralization in 
Korea and Japan from the following perspectives: 1) predictions for the 
two countries based on U.S. model where the independent and environ-
mental constructs from the U.S. may not be present; 2) the role of infor-
mation/expertise in structuring local level policy decision; and 3) measur-
ing shared values between the centre (national) and peripheries (local) 
as illustrated by policy decisions. In order to apply the Ragin methodol-
ogy, variables from the previous discussion on decentralization have been 
identified as follows:
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Table 1: Presence of Key Variables
U.S. Model Japan South Korea
Local fiscal autonomy No No
Local political autonomy Yes Yes
National party support Yes Yes
Local policymaking autonomy No No
Intergovernmental fiscal transparency Yes No
Intergovernmental information sharing Yes No
With the variables for comparison identified, the next step is to estab-
lish the context in which the variables for comparative analysis should be 
understood. This will be done by examining the context of local policy-
making in Japan and South Korea within the last two decades.
5.1. A Brief Comparative History
Both Japan and Korea have undergone attempts to decentralize public 
policy decisions, prompted by both external pressures from international 
forces, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but also due to 
internal pressures to broaden decision-making and institute more trans-
parent measures for setting policy, especially in the realm of economic 
and regulatory policies (Lim and Tang, 2002; Iwao, 1997). For both na-
tions, this combination of forces was both political and economic, and set 
in motion formal attempts to push policy decisions down to local levels 
(Japan 1, 2006; Korea 1, 2007; Minakir, 2011: 50–51).
5.2. The Power of Information
One of the prevalent themes in decentralization efforts in Japan and Ko-
rea has been over the control of information. Top-down structures for 
both collecting and releasing information have been a growing target of 
criticism from local officials and researchers in both countries. Bureau-
crats are often well-trained experts in particular policy areas at the na-
tional levels. Their pronouncements on policy are respected in ways that 
U.S. civil servants find enviable (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Pempel, 
1987; Lim and Tang, 2002). There are also much tighter controls on the 
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flow of information; the standard of evidence for »need to know« is much 
higher in Japan and Korea than in the U.S. For example, it is much harder 
for a Korean or Japanese local official to receive information on how to 
respond to an environmental hazard, such as a problem with a nuclear 
power facility, than it is for a counterpart in the U.S. Recent events in 
Fukushima highlight this in stark detail.
That said, local governments in both Japan and Korea have been increas-
ingly vocal in asserting what local officials see as differences in opinion 
with national policy since the mid-1990s. The siting2 of hazardous waste 
treatment facilities, for example, in Korea has become a matter of lo-
cal interest and therefore of intergovernmental dialogue (Lim and Tang, 
2002). In Japan, the voices of farming communities that have been hurt 
by globalization have become more strident and more influential in shap-
ing national policy (Rozman, 1999). The ability of local officials to plead 
their cases to national governments has increased dramatically in the last 
two decades. The big questions to be determined here are how and why.
The Case of Japan. In Japan, decentralization had little to do with devolu-
tion of political authority and decision-making. Local governments had 
limited powers, and often found themselves at odds with national policy 
approaches (Gotoda, 1985; Reed, 1986). Decentralization was actually 
viewed at the national level as a means to accomplish two goals: 1) in-
crease efficiency by pushing certain kinds of policy decisions down to 
the local level as deemed appropriate by the central government; and, 2) 
consolidate national power by co-opting local governments through party 
ties. The idea that these two goals might be contradictory did not seem 
to be considered a fatal flaw – far from it; this was considered a practical 
necessity.
In 2002, the Japanese Diet passed legislation that allowed local govern-
ments to play a larger role in making policy decisions that would affect 
local conditions. This was seen as an attempt to accomplish a number of 
things (Japan 1, 2006): first, it would render greater efficiencies in service 
provision, since localities would be able to decide what level of service was 
necessary given local conditions. If, for example, an area was experiencing 
a rapid greying of the population through a combined loss of young wage 
earners to larger urban centres and the increase in life expectancy of the 
elderly, instituting a national policy focusing on early childhood education 
2  The word »siting« here means placement, location. Site = location; site – siting, 
sited, »double t« is not required. Op. lekt.
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at the cost of geriatric health service provision might seem misguided. 
Second, such a loosening of central control would also allow for some 
load-shedding at the national level, since the central government would 
no longer be responsible for uniform policy implementation across Japan. 
Finally, this would allow local officials the opportunity to build up some 
local expertise in certain policy areas that were locally important, and be 
recognized for such expertise. If a locality became good at rice produc-
tion, they could share their expertise with other localities that might have 
similar aptitudes. The central government would be a mediator, rather 
than a primary source of information, thus (again) reducing costs. As a 
result, the need for high quality policy information at the local level has 
driven the establishment of prefecture level policy think tanks (Japan 2, 
2007).  
There are two observations to be made with respect to this last develop-
ment. First, these think tanks are mandated through national legislation, 
so the question of their political autonomy has been a bone of contention. 
Second, this bone of contention has been addressed in part through the 
privatization of these think tanks. In Japan, this means that their funding 
comes from corporate and university sources, rather than directly from 
the national government, and their staffing decisions are therefore not 
subject to the usual civil service requirements. This has had some inter-
esting consequences. Firstly, it has highlighted the level of distrust that 
often exists between local officials and the central government. Secondly, 
it has not necessarily quelled concerns about independence; corporate 
sponsors are sometimes viewed with as much suspicion as political lead-
ers, since coalitions between the two are common. Finally (and somewhat 
ironically), the quality of information provided by such think tanks has 
been called into question because they are not staffed by civil servants. 
Balancing these competing concerns has proven to be a challenge (Japan 
1, 2006; Japan 2, 2007).
The Case of Korea. In Korea, local governments had been operating as 
arms of the national government from 1961 and the beginning of military 
rule by President Park Chung Hee (Lim and Tang, 2002). It was not until 
1995 with the reinstatement of the elections of local governors, legisla-
tors and mayors that local governments were given any real authority or 
autonomy. This push to open up political institutions to more democratic 
norms was augmented by greater freedoms for the press, and more rights 
for certain groups, such as labour unions, to organize and protest. Overall, 
the level of participation in local politics has steadily risen since 1995, and 
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as the level of income has risen across the country, so too has the level of 
interest in power-sharing between the central and local governments.
However, the push to decentralize decision-making is much more recent 
and far less formalized than in Japan. The national government has recog-
nized that allowing local officials some leeway in making policy can render 
desirable national results. This is nowhere more evident than in the chang-
ing face of the capital city of Seoul and the southern city of Busan over 
the past decade. The ability of local mayors to engage national assistance, 
both fiscal and political, has allowed them a degree of discretion, if not 
auto nomy, that has had noticeable results. The redevelopment of down-
town Seoul and its success in bringing both domestic and international 
investment into the city has reaped political rewards for the mayor who 
oversaw the city’s transformation: he ran for the presidency and won.
Nevertheless, Korea’s highly centralized system of control, largely seen as 
a relic of its days under military rule, has proven difficult to deconstruct. 
The control of information at the national level has been largely tied to 
controls on political power. Getting things done in Korea requires a great 
deal of perseverance, and there are tiered levels of knowledge (Korea 2, 
2007; Lim and Tang, 2002). On a daily basis, local government officials 
rarely require information from the central government. Most of what 
needs to be accomplished can be done with minimal input from the capi-
tal. However, the exception to this rule lies in the revenue collection and 
redistribution system of the country. Information regarding fiscal matters 
is highly prized, and a great deal of political capital is often expended on 
determining exactly what the flow of intergovernmental revenue will be, 
and how many central strings will be tied to its local expenditure.
6.  Comparative Analysis: The Dissimilars  
and the Power of the Purse
It is the fiscal autonomy of local governments in the U.S. (or their po-
tential to be so) that most starkly sets them apart from their East Asian 
counterparts. Indeed, it is their capacity to raise revenues for local ex-
penditures, most notably in the policy area of education, which allows 
local governments in the U.S. a degree of discretion and power unknown 
to local governments in Japan and Korea. This capacity has proven the 
basis for often contentious relationships between successful cities and the 
states in which they reside. Poor states and wealthy cities can engage in 
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sparring over the sweeping of designated revenues during times of fiscal 
stress (Hawaii and Honolulu, Louisiana and New Orleans pre-Hurricane 
Katrina, and St. Louis and Missouri). Large successful cities are often the 
economic drivers of a state, and states will often go to great lengths to 
tap that power using the considerable political arsenals at their disposal 
(Zimmerman, 2009).  
Thus the relationships between cities and states can define policy out-
comes in ways that may surprise outside observers. Although there are of-
ten considerable long-term gains to be had if governments cooperate with 
each other, this is often not the reality. There is local political rent that can 
be won by officials who refuse to »play nicely« with their state counter-
parts. In the state of Michigan, for example, localities could save literally 
millions of dollars each year in maintenance costs by having smaller ci-
ties share joint police and/or fire fighting forces. By consolidating service 
provision, efficiencies from economies of scale could be realized (Carr, 
Leroux and Shrestha, 2009). Nevertheless, many smaller localities saw 
consolidation as a loss of political power – fire-fighters and police officers 
were often justifications for greater local expenditures, and could be used 
as political leverage at the state level when Michigan was missing national 
marks for crime and fire prevention. Thus many refused to consolidate, 
and continued to operate until cities went into bankruptcy. The state, in 
turn, then felt obligated to bail them out. 
However, this is not always a guarantee. Miami, for example, lived well 
beyond its means in the early 1990s, and after threatening to let its bond-
rating drop, turned to the state seeking a bailout. Then-Governor Lawton 
Chiles, an Osborne and Gaebler convert, called their bluff, and gave no 
assistance. The mayor of Miami and the city council were forced to cut 
service provision, and then faced the ire of residents at the ballot box. 
Autonomy and discretion come with requisite political accountability as 
well. It is here that Japan and Korea differ substantially.
Japan offers little fiscal autonomy to the prefecture level or city level of 
government. However, there is a great deal of political autonomy, since 
Japan, unlike the U.S., operates under parliamentary rules. Therefore, 
when the local party and ruling national party differ, there is still a way for 
local representation to be heard at the national level through party affili-
ates. This is not true within the U.S. Political parties have become more 
important over the past twenty years, but they still do not have the degree 
of policy coherence nor loyalty that their Japanese counterparts demon-
strate, and their influence in local level elections is often prohibited.  
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In Korea, local officials collect revenue, so they have an idea as to what 
they contribute to the nation’s coffers, but this may have no relation to 
what they receive after national redistribution. In addition, the lack of 
information transparency over fiscal issues gives rise to two perceptions 
with serious consequences: first, since the mechanisms for redistribution 
are often discussed behind closed doors, the perception that political fa-
vouritism plays a major role prevails; and second, this gives rise to the 
expectation that there is always some degree of corruption at the upper 
echelons of government. These perceptions undermine the ability of lo-
cal officials to convince their constituencies that they are acting in good 
faith with the public’s best interests at heart, and for fledgling democratic 
institutions, this lack of trust can be corrosive (Korea 2, 2010).
7.  General Observations for Framework 
Development
At this stage of research, it is difficult to proceed with a sufficient level of 
confidence to select variables at a finer grain of detail for inclusion in the 
comparative analysis. However, some general observations can be made 
at this point in the data collection: 
U.S. democratic and market models as drivers. Although the U.S. is by no 
means the only model of democratic governance with some success at 
decentralization, the policy-making models often used by East Asian 
governments wishing to emulate the economic success of the west are 
predominantly from the U.S. (Gupta, 2010). This may be because of a 
historic emphasis on managerialism and efficiency in U.S. approaches 
rather than a focus on legalist and administrative values more prevalent in 
Europe (Raadschelders, 2003: 187–207). Although this is an oversimpli-
fication, it does explain why one of the clear expectations of decentraliza-
tion is economic gain. A second expectation is transparency; since this is 
as strongly associated with democratic practices as it is with free market 
principles (Iwao, 1997).
A model that has not aged well. The economic crisis of 2007 in the U.S. and 
around the world has taken the shine off the idea that democratic prac-
tices and market freedoms go hand in hand. Although this connection has 
long been contested within academic circles, this has had little practical 
impact on policy formation or adoption in political circles, both in Japan 
and Korea. The market crash did more to prompt a re-examination of 
these models than any amount of academic chiding could.
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The explosion of communication technology in East Asia. Twenty years ago, 
the U.S. was well ahead of most of the world in the development of com-
munication technologies that utilized the Web – today the U.S. lags 
behind most of the industrialized world in investment in the infrastruc-
ture necessary to keep such technologies in top working order. This lag 
is particularly evident in Korea, where technological advancements have 
launched investment in communication technologies that would have 
been unthinkable ten years ago. Japan has also narrowed the gap but not 
quite as convincingly as many of its regional neighbours (Korea 2, 2010; 
Japan 2, 2007). This advancement has had huge consequences for the 
ability of governments at all levels to provide transparency to their citi-
zenry in service provision. As people become increasingly sophisticated in 
their consumption of information, governments have had to keep up or 
face distrust and/or unrest among their constituents. Faced with sources 
of information that are available from beyond their own borders (both 
national and local), government officials are increasingly aware of how 
they stack up against other publics. More importantly, the citizenry is 
more aware, and this has consequences for the legitimacy of government 
authority. This was certainly put on display in Japan during the aftermath 
of the March 2011 earthquake/tsunami and is still ongoing. Similar pres-
sures have been placed on South Korea during the torpedo attack and 
shelling by the North Koreans. What has been interesting has been to 
note the difference in how the two nations responded to these different 
crises.
The rise of democratic institutions. Although both Japan and Korea have 
been holding elections since the post-war period, neither has had what 
might be characterized as open and fair elections until relatively recently. 
The challenge to the Liberal Democratic Party’s rule of Japan has only 
recently been made credible, and this has been due in part to its perceived 
failure to deliver on economic promises made over several decades. In 
Korea, the rise of a new and rather cheeky free press has given a voice to 
previously unheard publics, and has allowed for a level of frank discus-
sion of national shortcomings that is quite surprising (Korea 2, 2010). 
Japan has always supported a vibrant and well-heeled press, but outside 
of Tokyo, access to information becomes much more difficult. Thus, the 
skewing of information to national level concerns is due in part to Tokyo’s 
role as both the economic and political centre of Japan.  
Increased recognition of separation of business and politics. If the market crash 
of 2007 taught the Koreans and the Japanese anything of value, it was the 
necessity of a divide between national political power and large economic 
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interests. After decades of chiding the Japanese for shoring up a banking 
system that was overly cosy in its relationships with politicians, and after a 
very painful restructuring of Korea’s economy under order from the IMF, 
the U.S. has demonstrated that it needs to practice what it preaches. This 
example has provided more legitimacy to academic prescriptions than 
could have been hoped two decades ago.
8. Tentative Conclusions and Future Research
The key assumptions of decentralization and its supposed benefits in the 
U.S. are premised on a mix of understandings about what works best at 
the local level of government. From a politically pluralist perspective, the 
idea that local populations should be able to exercise more control over 
decisions about which they have better information resonates. However, 
for institutional theorists, such ideas may seem naive and counterproduc-
tive. Local governments that lack the capacity, either through information 
or experience, to deal with the influence of powerful players, either po-
litical, economic, or both, often have themselves overwhelmed. In many 
cases, this has meant that the anticipated benefits of decentralization 
have bypassed those local units that might have benefited most from re-
distribution of power and resources.
The conditions in Japan and Korea have certainly not meant a restructur-
ing of political power, although there are marked differences from two 
decades ago. The global economic forces that have raised the East Asia 
region to new levels of living standards have also threatened the capacity 
of both countries to deal with growing disparities between urban and rural 
areas. Decentralization has in some ways provided a mechanism for eas-
ing that transition. Nevertheless, it will not serve as a means of stopping 
or slowing the urbanization rates, even if this is one of the expectations of 
decentralization efforts.  
The missing piece of the East Asian puzzle is the role that China will play. 
Its size and ambitions (and rocky history in the case of Japan) mean that 
its omission from this discussion is key. Future research on the impact 
of decentralization in East Asia must include a discussion of China and 
its own attempts to decentralize. Here, the role that information plays in 
local governance will be even more important than in either of its closest 
neighbours, and decisions made by local officials will play an increasingly 
visible role in structuring national priorities. 
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TEXTBOOK VS. PRAXIS: COMPARATIVE LESSONS IN  
POLICY-MAKING AT THE LOCAL LEVEL  
IN EAST ASIA
Summary
In the United States, there are multiple models of policy-making, some more well-
known than others (Lasswell, 1951; Peterson, 1991). In general, these models 
have a normative basis that equates pluralist systems of democratic governance 
with economic free market systems. Thus certain political configurations, such 
as decentralized government structures, are assumed to have economic benefits. 
Such assumptions do not necessarily appear in European models of decentrali-
zation. This paper lays out the U.S. intergovernmental models, and then exami-
nes some of the key assumptions of such models. It is then examined how such 
models fare in the local policy-making environments of Japan and Korea under 
the decentralization programs of the late 1990s and early 2000s. This exami-
nation highlights a marked difference in the understanding (and enactment) of 
the decentralization of policy-making between the U.S. and East Asia. Finally, 
some of the decentralization efforts in Europe are compared with both U.S. and 
East Asian approaches, and still unique conditions are found in East Asia that 
demonstrate growing rifts between the centre and the peripheries.
Key words: policy-making, intergovernmental models, decentralization, local 
government, United States of America, Japan, Korea, East Asia
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TEORIJA NASPRAM PRAKSE:  
KOMPARATIVNE LEKCIJE IZ OBLIKOVANJA POLITIKA  
NA LOKALNOJ RAZINI U ISTO!NOJ AZIJI 
Sa"etak
U SAD postoje vi#estruki modeli oblikovanja javnih politika, neki poznatiji 
od drugih. Op$enito, ti modeli imaju normativnu osnovu koja izjedna%ava 
pluralisti%ke sustave demokratske vladavine s ekonomskim sustavima slobodnog 
tr"i#ta. Tako se pretpostavlja da odre&ene politi%ke konfiguracije, kao #to su 
decentralizirane strukture vlasti, daju odre&ene ekonomske rezultate. Takva se 
pretpostavka nu"no ne pojavljuje u europskim modelima decentralizacije. U 
radu se obrazla"u ameri%ki modeli odnosa me&u vlastima te se ispituju neke 
klju%ne pretpostavke tih modela. Nakon toga se analizira kako takvi modeli 
djeluju pri oblikovanju javnih politika na lokalnoj razini u Japanu i Koreji u 
uvjetima programa decentralizacije kasnih 1990-ih i ranih 2000-ih. Analiza 
nagla#ava zna%ajnu razliku u razumijevanju i ozakonjivanju decentralizacije 
oblikovanja javnih politika koja postoji izme&u SAD i isto%ne Azije. Na kraju 
se uspore&uju decentralizacijski napori u Europi s pristupima u SAD i isto%noj 
Aziji i nalazi da jo# uvijek postoje jedinstveni uvjeti u isto%noj Aziji koji poka-
zuju rastu$i jaz izme&u centra i periferija. 
Klju!ne rije!i: oblikovanje politika, modeli odnosa me&u vlastima, decentrali-
zacija, lokalna samouprava, SAD, Japan, Koreja, isto%na Azija 
